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WHY NO RULE OF LAW IN MEXICO?
EXPLAINING THE WEAKNESS OF MEXICO'S
JUDICIAL BRANCH
MICHAEL C. TAYLOR*
I. INTRODUCTION
The news of lawlessness from Mexico crosses the border quickly. The former
President, a national hero while in office, is hidden in exile, acting like a fugitive
from justice.! Newspaper headlines report that the former President's brother
holds over eighty million dollars in Swiss bank accounts under false names.2 The
former President's brother is accused of planning the assassination of the ruling
party's number two leader.3 The assassinated man's brother is arrested in a New
York airport with over ten million dollars in cash which he cannot explain.4 High
profile Mexican authorities are shot dead and officials claim suicide.5 Drug-
interdiction officers are murdered in the streets of Mexico City, and guerrillas
appear in four southern states of Mexico."
Behind the headlines from Mexico lies a deep problem. It reaches far into the
Mexican heart of darkness, further than the sensational stories would suggest; it
affects the life of every Mexican citizen, every day. There is no rule of law in
Mexico.7
These headlines reveal to citizens of the United States how little we know
about the Mexican judicial system. Our two countries' fates are connected through
an economic treaty,' and our people through a common border, yet two juridical
* Michael C. Taylor researched reforms to the Mexican Constitution as a Fulbright Scholar in Mexico
during 1995-96. He is a 1995 graduate of Harvard College and also a graduate of the United World College
of the American West in Montezuma, New Mexico. He is presently a management consultant in New York
City. He would like to thank the Fulbright Commission and the Institute of International Education, both in New
York City and in Mexico City, for making this research possible. His upcoming article Constitutional Crisis:
How Reforms to the Legislature Have Doomed Mexico will appear in 13 MEXICAN STUDIFSIEST-m IOS
MExiCANOS (forthcoming Summer 1997).
1. See Tim Golden, Salinas, at Successor's Request, Leaves for Virtual Exile in U.S., N.Y. ThEs, Mar.
13, 1995, at Al, available in LEXIS/NEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
2. See Julia Preston, Mexico's Former Chief Expresses 'Amazement' at Brother's Hoard, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov.
27, 1995, at A6, available in LEXIS/NEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
3. See Sam Dillon, Zedillo Lectures the Mexicans: Obey the Law, N.Y. TIMms, Oct. 1, 1996, at A3,
available in LEXISINEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
4. See Robert L. Jackson & Juanita Darling, U.S. Judge Won't Exradite Former Mexico Official, LA.
TIMES, June 23,1995, at Al, available in WESTLAW, LAT database, 1995 WL 2059057, at *1.
5. See Anthony DePalma, Mexico's Question: Who's in Charge, Anyway?, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1995, at
A6, available in LEXIS/NEXIS, News Library, NYT File; Tim Golden, Mexico Judge in Union Case Is Shot
Dead, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1995, at A8, available in LEXIS/NEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
6. See Julia Preston, Mexico Confronts Rebels with Limited Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1996, at
All, available in LEXIS/NEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
7. I define "rule of law" as the constructive interaction of institutional and cultural factors characterized
by lawfulness on the part of both a nation's government and its citizens. In Mexico, the phrase estado de
derecho is used to denote the same concept. Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo has made establishing the rule
of law a goal of his administration. See Dillon, supra note 3, at A3. President Zedillo's efforts, however, only
highlight Mexico's falling short of the mark. See idL
8. See North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 107 Stat. 2057
(effective Jan. 1, 1994).
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systems help to keep Mexico and the United States on opposite sides of the
world. So little has been written in English about the judicial branch in Mexico
that the subject begs for an introduction.9 My purpose, therefore, is to provide
background and to provoke debate.
The most important feature about Mexico's judicial branch ° is that it is weak
in comparison to Mexico's other branches of government. Why is the Mexican
judicial branch weak? Some of the causes stem from cultural and structural
conditions endemic to Latin America. 2 Others derive from Mexico's peculiar
historical development throughout the last two centuries. 3 Another explanation,
adopted here, emphasizes the legal and institutional roots of a weak court system.
This Article focuses on the institutional sources of judicial weakness specific
to Mexico. Part II introduces the power of the Roman law system as the dominant
juridical paradigm adopted by Mexico, provides background on the most
9. For example, there is only one book written in English on the amparo suit (a method of judicial review
and a means of challenging the constitution). See RICHARD D. BAKER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN MEXICO: A STUDY
OF THE AmPARo SuIT (1971). Very few articles in English describe the Mexican system of judicial review and
the amparo suit The most complete is Lucio Cabrera & William Cecil Headrick, Notes on Judicial Review in
Mexico and the United States, 5 INTER-AM. L. REV. 253 (1963). See also Carlos del Rio Rodrfguez, Judicial
Review Seen From a Mexican Perspective, 20 CAL. W. INTL LJ. 10 (1989-1990). A few recent articles have
reviewed the 1994 judicial reforms. See Note, Liberalismo Contra Democracia: Recent Judicial Reform in
Mexico, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1919 (1995) [hereinafter Recent Judicial Reform]; Jorge A. Vargas, The Rebirth of
the Supreme Court of Mexico: An Appraisal of President Zedillo's Judicial Reform of 1994, 11 Am. U. J. INL
L. & POL'Y 295 (1996).
10. The Mexican judicial branch consists of a Supreme Court (Suprema Corte), federal circuit courts
(tribunales de circuito), and local courts, also known as district courts (tribunales de distrito). See CONSTrUCION
POLTCA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MXICANOS [Political Constitution of the United Mexican States] art 94.
See generally TOM BARRY, MEXICO: A COUNTRY GUIDE 13 (1992).
Tides of judges fall into three categories according to rank: Supreme Court justices are ministers (ministros),
circuit court judges are magistrates (magistrados), and district court judges are simply judges (jueces). See
CoNsTITuCI&N POLTICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANos art. 94.
Federal circuit courts may be unitary--comprised of one magistrate (tribunales unitarios de circuito)--or
they may be collegial-comprised of three magistrates (tribunales colegiales de circuito). The collegial type of
circuit courts, created by a constitutional reform in 1951 specifically to hear amparo suits, was based on the
United States court system. See H&ctor Fix-Zamudio, La Suprema Corte de Justicia y el Juicio de Amparo, in
LA SUPREmA CORTE DE JUsTnCIA Y EL PENsAMENTO JURIDICO [The Supreme Court of Justice and Juridical
Thought] 162-64 (Poder Judicial de la Federaci6n ed., 1985). For a discussion of amnparo suits, see infra Part
II.C.
The executive branch also oversees a number of court systems which are not directly subordinate to the
Supreme Court. These courts have specialized jurisdictions, regulated by particular legislative codes. See
CENTRO DE INVEsTIGACI6N PARA EL DEsAmOLLo, A.C., REPORMA DEL SISTEMA POLITICO MEImCANO:
ALTERNATIVAS PARA EL FUTURO [Mexican Political System Reforms: Alternatives for the Future] 170 (1990)
[hereinafter REFORMA DEL SISTEMA]; see also ELiSUR ARTEAGA NAVA, DERECHO CONSITriuCIONAL:
INSTITUCIONES FEDERAtES, ESTATALES Y MuNIcIPALES (Constitutional Law: Federal, State and Municipal
Institutions] 493-94 (1994).
11. See ARTEAGA NAVA, supra note 10, at 494-96; see also REFoRMA DEL SISTEMA, supra note 10, at 158.
12. See Keith S. Rosenn, The Protection of Judicial Independence in Latin America, 19 U. MIAMI INTER-
AM. L. REV. 1, 23-32 (1987).
13. For a historical review of Mexico's judicial branch, see Fix-Zamudio, supra note 10; see also Lucio
Cabrera, La Revolucidn de 1910 y el Poder Judicial Federal, in LA SUPREMA CORTE DE JUSTICIA Y EL
PENSAMIENTO JURIDICO 181 (Poder Judicial de la Federaci6n ed., 1985); REPoRMA DEL SISTEMA, supra note
10, at 166-71.
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important constitutional reforms to the judicial branch, and describes the amparo
suit. Part Im focuses on the Mexican judicial branch's weaknesses and limitations
and provides an analysis of recent constitutional reforms to the judiciary. Part IV
provides final thoughts on the structure of the Mexican judicial system. The
purpose throughout is to show how contemporary Mexico's courts are weak and
ineffective by institutional design. While I offer no solutions, I believe it is
important to take the first step and diagnose the cause.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Mexico and the Roman Law Tradition
Mexico inherited Spain's Roman law tradition when it gained independence
from Spain between 1810 and 1821.14 The Roman law tradition, which evolved
into what most Western European countries now call the civil law,15 embodies
a set of characteristics and legal values distinct from the common law tradition
of most English-speaking countries.16
Perhaps the foremost value in Roman law is certainty. To ensure certainty,
legislators in Roman law countries attempt to set out complete written legal
codes. 8 Where a law is imprecise or fails to address an issue, the legislature is
the body which completes the code. 9 The theoretical advantage of codification
is that both citizens and the government know what the law is before a legal
conflict arises.'n Unlike the United States Constitution, Mexico's Magna Carta
is meant to be an exhaustively complete code of rules, procedures, rights, and
duties for Mexico's rulers and ruled.21 If a right is not specifically listed in
Mexico's Constitution, for example, then that right does not exist. Rules may not
be implied, but rather must be expressly spelled out.2
The need for certainty means that legislation, rather than judicial interpretation,
is the basis for legal reforms. ' Certainty demands that lawmaking not be left to
the potentially ambiguous outcome of a judicial decision. Due to the need for
14. See generally Fix-Zamudio, supra note 10, at 118-20 (addressing the Mexican legal development
between 1810-1824).
15. The "civil law system," as it is known by common law countries, is referred to as the "Roman law
system" in civil law countries. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADrTON: AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE LEGAL SYsTEMs OF WEsTRN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 7 (2d ed. 1985).
16. See id at 1-5.
17. See i at 48-49.
18. See id. at 29, 48.
19. See id at 29, 39. In Mexico, however, the executive exerts pressure over a weak legislature to rewrite
the code.
20. See iU at 28.
21. This statement may be deduced from the Roman law tradition's emphasis on complete codification, and
by the great number of reforms to Mexico's Constitution. See iU at 26; SERGOIO ELIAS GurtEZ S. &
ROBERTO RIVES S., LA CONSrImICION MEXICANA AL FINAL DEL SIoLO XX [The Mexican Constitution at the
End of the Twentieth Century] 155 (1995). The quantity of reforms suggests an attempt at "perfection" of the
law.
22. See MERRYMAN, supra note 15, at 28-29.
23. See id
Winter 1997]
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certainty in the Roman law tradition, the Mexican legislature is constantly in the
process of rewriting its Constitution of 1917.'
The need for certainty also has implications for constitutional interpretation.
Because judicial interpretation brings with it the taint of uncertainty, legal
interpretation is not performed by judges, but rather by academic specialists. 25
This tradition dates back to the sixth-century Roman codes of Emperor Justinian,
when interpretation of the law fell on the shoulders of intellectuals, academics,
and professors, but never into the hands of the public servants charged with
applying the law.2 Due to their interpretive role in the Roman law tradition,
scholars have had a comparatively greater influence on the law than that afforded
to their counterparts in common law countries.27 The corollary to this is that
judges in the Roman law tradition are not given the same power as their
counterparts in the common law tradition, where judges are expected to apply,
interpret, and, in many cases, effectively create law.
The influence of the Roman law system on the Mexican judicial branch
becomes clearer in light of both the great number of constitutional reforms to the
Mexican judicial branch and Mexico's method of judicial review. An introduction
to these two topics forms the remainder of this background section.
B. Historical Patterns of Constitutional Reforms to the Judiciary
We can learn much about the origins of Mexico's judicial weakness through
a historical review of reforms to Mexico's Constitution of 1917. Four discouraging
patterns emerge from Mexico's constitutional reforms. From 1917 to the present,
reforms show: (1) an attempt to undercut judicial prestige; (2) an effort to curtail
the autonomy of the Supreme Court; (3) an adherence to overly rigid theories of
law; and (4) a mistrust of the judiciary?2 It should be acknowledged that these
last two patterns, theoretical rigidity and mistrust of courts, are not exclusive to
the Mexican political system, but have roots in the Roman law tradition.29
Roman law traditionally places a heavy emphasis on theories of law, as scholars
instead of judges interpret controversial issues."
The historical review below includes only a fraction of all the constitutional
changes made to the judicial branch. It focuses on reforms related to the structure
24. See GUrEtRR & RivEs, supra note 21, at 155 (counting 344 reforms to the Constitution since 1917).
Since 1995, the legislature has passed 18 more reforms to the Constitution, bringing the running total to 362.
See Miguel Angel Judrez & Daniel Moreno, Logra el acuerdo un 'pase' histrrico. REPORMA, Aug. 1, 1996, at
IA.
25. See MERRYMAN, supra note 15, at 56-60.
26. See id. at 57-58 (citing Byzantine Emperor Justinian I's CoRPUs JURIS CIVnIS (533 ad.)).
27. See iU at 56-60.
28. This is partly from a lack of respect for the judiciary and partly from a need to control the courts as
a competing branch of government. The executive traditionally has held a tight rein on the judiciary. "The
Spanish judges would impart justice in the name of the king; the Mexicans, although formally doing it in the
name of the Mexican Republic, really do it in the spirit of justice [as defined by] the President." ARTEAGA
NAVA, supra note 10, at 462 (translation by Michael C. Taylor).
29. See MERRYMAN, supra note 15, at 62-64 (discussing the potential for theoretical rigidity of thought),
15-16, 28-29 (discussing mistrust of the judiciary); see also REPORMA DEL SISmTEmA, supra note 10, at 164.
30. See ME.RYMAN, supra note 15, at 59-60.
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of the Supreme Court: terms of office, the process for naming ministers, the number
of ministers, and the number of Salas (Chambers) in the Supreme Court.3 '
1. 1917
The 1917 Constitutional Congress decided that the Mexican Supreme Court
should always act as a unified decision-making body.32 This mandated unity was
a change from the nineteenth-century Supreme Court, which was divided into
three specialized Salas, each empowered to hear cases within a different field of
law.33 The constitutionalists' rationale for transforming the Supreme Court was
that the Supreme Court's deliberations should include the opinions of all Supreme
Court members and that dividing the Supreme Court into Salas threatened the
unity and power of the judicial branch.?
To further its mandate of judicial unity, the Constitutional Congress created a
Supreme Court of eleven ministers. 35 Eleven, the constitutionalists argued,
represented a reasonable size for the Supreme Court to act as a collegial body in
making unified decisions.'
The constitutionalists also deliberated about how to make the Supreme Court
autonomous from the executive, under whom it suffered throughout the nineteenth
century.37 The constitutionalists understood that the process of selecting ministers
determined the independence of the entire judiciary, by the simple truth that a
person responsible for appointments to any political position retains power over that
position.3" The constitutionalists therefore placed the selection in the hands of
3 1. See FEIJP TENA RAMREZ DERECHO CONS=rJCIONAL MEXICANO [Mexican Constitutional Law] 484-85
(1995). Two recent articles describe the 1994 liquidation and replacement of the entire Supreme Court with eleven
new ministers, but both articles contain errors of fact. See Vargas, supra note 9, at 297. Vargas describes President
Zedillo's abolition of the sitting court as "an unprecedented decision," despite the fact that Presidents Plutarco Elias
Calles and LAzaro CArdenas had done the same thing in 1928 and in 1934, respectively. See id at 297; TENA
RAMIREz, supra, at 484-85; see also Recent Judicial Reform, supra note 9, at 1929. This latter Note states that
ministers served six-year terms of office, coinciding with a presidential administration, implying that appointing
eleven new ministers in 1994 represented a normal substitution, when in fact sitting ministers on the Supreme Court
had lifetime tenures from 1944 to 1994. See Recent JudicialReform, supra note 9, at 1919; CONSTITUci6N POLITICA
DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS art. 94 (modified 9/21/44); see also GuTdRREZ & RIvEs, supra note 21, at
330-31.
For a description of the Mexican judicial branch and the titles of the various Mexican judges and justices, see
supra note 10.
32. See CONSTriUCI6N POLtrICA DE Los EsTADos UNIDos MEXIcANOs art. 94 (modified 8/20/28);
GUrtxt & RIVES, supra note 21, at 330; see also Cabrera, supra note 13, at 205.
33. See Cabrera, supra note 13, at 205. The Supreme Court was divided into Salas (Chambers) before 1857
and after 1900. See id
34. See id
35. See CoNSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS art. 94.
36. See Cabrera, supra note 13, at 204-05.
37. See id at 197-98.
38. See ARTEAGA NAVA, supra note 10, at 482-83.
Removal power is also a source of control over a position. By law, procedures for removal depend upon
the level of the judge. Since 1994, magistrates and judges are subject to discipline by the Consejo de la
Judicatura Federal (Council of the Federal Judiciary). See CONsTITUCI6N POLTInCA DE LOS ESTADOS UNiDOS
MEXICANOS art. 100 (modified 12/31/94); Mario Melgar Adalid, El Consejo de la Judicatura Federal y la
Reforma al Poder Judicial de Mdxico [The Federal Judicial Council and the Reform of Mexico's Judicial
Winter 1997]
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Congress, which would approve each individual minister by a two-thirds majority
vote.39 Nominations for minister would come from each state legislature.' By
giving the state legislatures the power of nomination, the constitutionalists sought
to break the pattern of Supreme Court subordination to the President.4 '
As a second measure to ensure judicial independence, ministers received
qualified lifetime appointments. This measure was meant to further strengthen
the judicial branch, as the Constitution implied that ministers could only be
removed for bad conduct.43 The vote of confidence in the judiciary, as illustrated
by lifetime appointments, was tempered, however, by transitional legislation.
Lifetime appointments would only be allowed after an initial two-year
probationary "trial" period, followed by an additional four-year "trial" period."
After each "trial" period the legislature could review each minister's conduct and
determine reappointment.4'
2. 1928
President Plutarco Elias Calles, who would do more than almost any other
Mexican leader in the twentieth century to institutionalize the dominance of the
executive branch, weakened the judicial power created by the 1917 reforms. In
1928, all ministers had lifetime appointments, but President Calles, in disregard
for the division of governmental powers and the 1917 Constitution, summarily
discharged all the Supreme Court ministers.4
Following his own precedent, President Calles instituted a series of reforms,
which ignored not only the Constitution's division of powers, but much of the
original intent of the 1917 constitutionalists. In the most important reform of
1928, President Calles returned nominations for ministers to the pre-1917 formula,
Power], 13 ARs luRis 185 (1995). See also infra Parts I.B.4.a and lU.C.2.
Before 1994, magistrates and judges were subject to discipline. See CONsTUicI6N PoLrITcA DE LOS
ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS art. 94; see also infra notes 171-173 and accompanying text. The Constitution
also included a clause, modified to be more or less threatening as needed over the years, which allowed for
justices to be removed following a trial for misconduct. See CONSTrUCI6N POLITICA DE Los ESTADOS UNiDoS
MExICANOS art. 94. Ministers of the Supreme Court have always been subject to a process of removal by
Congressional trial, as recognized by the Constitution in the section regarding conduct of public servants. See
CONSTIUCI6N POLITICA DE LOS ESTADoS UNIDOS MEXICANOS art. 108-114.
Between 1928-1934, however, the President enjoyed the special privilege of being able to ask the Mexican
Congress to vote for the removal of Supreme Court ministers by a simple majority, without the burden of having
to prove misconduct. See CONSTITUC16N POa.,nCA DE LOS ESTADOS UNfiDS MEXICANOS art. 94 (modified
8/2/28 and 12/15/34); REFoR A DEL SwTEmA supra note 10, at 172. This power of removal served to cow the
judiciary. In actual practice, however, the President has not used the constitutional method to dismiss ministers
of the Supreme Court. The executive has routinely fired all sitting Supreme Court ministers and reappointed
new ones. See infra Part U.B.2-UI.B.4.
39. See CoNsITmuC6N POLITICA DE LOS ESTAD S UNIDOS MEXICANOS art. 96.
40. See id
41. See ARTEAGA NAVA, supra note 10, at 484-85.
42. See CoNSTriuci6N POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOs MEXICANOS art. 94.
43. See Cabrera, supra note 13. at 203; see also supra note 38 and accompanying text.
44. See CoNsTmiucI6N POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOs UNIDos MmxicANos art. 94.
45. See id
46. See TENA RAMIR supra note 31, at 484-85.
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giving the President the power to name the Supreme Court ministers with the
approval of the Senate rather than the entire Congress.4 If the constitutionalists
of 1917 had believed in any one principle, it was that the President should not
appoint Supreme Court ministers, given Mexico's historical experience of
excessive presidential influence over the judicial and legislative branches. '
Changes in 1928 also included an expansion of the Supreme Court from eleven
to sixteen ministers,49 disregarding the 1917 constitutionalists' justifications for
a small Supreme Court.:" President Calles' expansion of the Supreme Court
seems to have been initiated with the purpose of increasing his power.51 The
reforms further distorted the framers' intent by re-dividing (in pre-1917 fashion)
the Supreme Court into three Salas, composed of five ministers each (the
President of the Supreme Court did not belong to any Sala).52 Each Sala was
established to hear specialized cases in civil, penal, and administrative law.53
3. 1934
The reform of 1934 must be understood in the context of a period of further
consolidation of political power in the hands of the President. In 1933, the
47. See GUT1PRREZ & RIVEs, supra note 21, at 335.
48. See ARTEAGA NAVA, supra note 10, at 482-85. Judicial reform in 1928 should be understood in the
larger political and historical context of a period of years during which the presidential-authoritarian regime took
the shape which it has retained to this day.
In 1929, Calles founded the predecessor party to the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional
Revolutionary Party) (PRI), which is today the longest consecutive ruling party in the world. See generally
BARRY, supra note 10, at 6, 9. Since Cales' regime, the PRI has been closely tied with the office of the
presidency, a symbiotic relationship which has made the PRI overwhelmingly dominant among parties and the
presidency overwhelmingly dominant among the three separate branches of government. See id at 13. A PRI
majority in both houses of Congress and a pliant judiciary have combined to give the office of the presidency
an inordinate amount of political power from 1928 to the present. The President's unwritten power to hand-pick
his successor also has concentrated power in the executive branch, because every would-be President accedes
to the current President's wishes or loses access to power. See id at 17. Since 1928, the Congress has never
acted as an effective check on the President, nor has the Supreme Court challenged the President on any case
of significance. See id at 16, 18.
49. See GUTiRREz & RiVES, supra note 21, at 330.
50. See Cabrera, supra note 13, at 204-05. Like President Calles, leaders in other Latin American countries
have increased the numbers of Supreme Court justices with the intention of augmenting their influence. The
Brazilian military government in the 1960s treated Brazil's highest court "like a suitcase," packing it and
unpacking it at will. See Rosenn, supra note 12, at 27-28. In 1990, Argentina's President Carlos Menem secured
legislation which expanded Argentina's Supreme Court from five justices to nine, allowing President Menem
to fill the court with candidates of his own choosing. See Owen Fiss, The Right Degree of Independence, in
TRANSION TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 55, 62 (Irwin Stotzky ed.,
1993).
[EDs. NOTE: In the United States, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's "court packing" plan of 1936
proposed giving the executive the power to appoint one additional justice for each justice over the age of seventy
(six at the time), hoping to gain judicial support for Roosevelt's New Deal programs which were being
invalidated by the Supreme Court at the time. See MICHAEL LES BENEDICr, THE BLESsiNG OF LIBERTY: A
CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTON OF THE UNITED STATES 296-97 (1996).]
51. Nineteen twenty-eight would not be the last time a Mexican President decided to increase the size of
the Supreme Court in the interest of weakening the judicial branch. See infra Part II.B.3.
52. See GurtkREz & RIVES, supra note 21, at 330.
53. See EMnuO 0. RABASA & GLORIA CABALLERO, MEXICANO: tSTA Es Tu CoNsTrIuaT6N [Mexico: This
Is Your Constitution] 250 (1995).
Winter 1997]
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elimination of the ability of legislators to run for re-election' ensured that
Congress would remain a docile adjunct of the executive branch.55 In 1934 it
was the Supreme Court's turn for submission.
Perhaps the only twentieth-century Mexican President who rivaled President
Calles in sheer aggregated power was his successor, Lzaro CArdenas. 56 With
obvious disregard for an independent judiciary, President Cdrdenas began his
reform, like President Calles before him, by firing all of the sitting ministers of
the Supreme Court, despite their guarantees of lifetime tenure.57
Continuing in the direction of the 1928 reforms, and in direct conflict with the
intentions of the 1917 constitutionalists, President CArdenas increased the number
of ministers to twenty-one, and added an additional Sala for labor cases.5 The
1917 constitutionalists' arguments for a court which acted as a unified body with
a manageable number of ministers were again consigned to the dustbin of history.
Unlike previous reforms, the 1934 reform eliminated the constitutional
provision of lifetime tenure for Supreme Court ministers, and replaced it with six-
year terms, to run concurrent with the presidential term. 59  The elimination of
lifetime tenure for ministers sealed Presidents Calles and Cdrdenas' transformation
of Mexico's Constitution from a document which guaranteed a strong presidency
to one guaranteeing an unequal presidentialist regime.
Although the six-year terms were later re-expanded to lifetime positions in
1944,' the low opinion held for the Supreme Court, which the 1928 and 1934
reforms established, remains to this day. A position on the Supreme Court
54. See GurntREZ & RIVES, supra note 21, at 282; CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS
MEUCANOS art. 59 (modified 4/29/33); see also Michael C. Taylor, Constitutional Crisis: How Reforms to the
Legislature Have Doomed Mexico, 13 MEXICAN STUDms/EsTuDIos MEXICANOS (forthcoming Summer 1997).
According to the Constitution of 1917, members of the two houses of Congress could be re-elected after their
term expired. See CoNsTrrucI6N PoLtIcA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXcANos art. 59, original. Since 1933,
and continuing to this day, however, members of Congress are forbidden from seeking re-election. See id art.
59 (modified 4/29/33). Technically, a member may leave office for a term and then seek it again after a "sitting
out" period. See id
It is easy to see why the Mexican Congress would be and has been weakened immeasurably by the ban on
re-election. No member of Congress gains legislative experience, seniority, or prestige which would empower
him or her to check the power of the President. Legislative obsequiousness to the President is an outcome of
the ban on re-election. Further, because the legislator does not depend upon the electorate for his or her next
political position, he or she has little incentive to serve the voters. Regardless of performance, the legislator is
forced out of office. The beneficiary of the ban on legislative re-election in terms of power is the President.
55. See, e.g., REFIRMA DEL SISTEMA. supra note 10, at 148.
56. There were a few interim Presidents between Calles and C&rdenas. See id at 229.
57. See TENA RAMIREz, supra note 31, at 484-85.
58. See RABASA & CABALLERO, supra note 53, at 250; CoNSTITUCI6N POLTICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS
MxIFCANOS art. 94 (modified 12/15/34). Twenty-one was a number too large to allow for thoughtful discussions
or consensus on legal issues. See GUTitRREz & RIvEs, supra note 21, at 331.
The Reform of 1951 added five extra "floating" ministers known as "ministros supernwmerarios" to the
existing twenty-one, further diluting the power of the ministers on the Supreme Court. See id; CoNSTITucI6N
POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDos MEIucANos art. 94 (modified 2/19/51).
59. See GtRru z & RIVES, supra note 21, at 330; CoNsTrrucI6N POLtIIcA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOs
MEXCANOS art. 94 (modified 12/15/34).
60. See GuTuftRREz & RIvEs, supra note 21, at 331; CONsTrrUCION POLtnCA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS
MEXICANOS art. 94 (modified 9/21/44).
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continues to lack the prestige, for example, of a good teaching position at a
respected law school in Mexico.6' The 1928 and 1934 reforms help to explain
this phenomenon.
4. 1994
Incoming President Ernesto Zedillo, enjoying the mandate of a reasonably clean
election, announced on December 5, 1994 his intention to reform twenty-seven
constitutional articles relating to the judicial branch.62 Twenty-six days later, on
December 31, 1994, the reforms became official through publication in the Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos (The Official News
of the Federation of the United Mexican States).63 True to the historical
precedent of his predecessors in 1928 and 1934, President Zedillo began the
reform by dissolving the existing Supreme Court.' Zedillo's reform eliminated
the "floating" ministers of the Supreme Court, and reduced the numbers of
ministers from twenty-one to eleven.65 Concurrent with shrinking the number of
Supreme Court ministers, the 1994 reform also shrank the number of specialized
Salas from four to two, one for administrative and labor cases, the other for civil
and penal cases.66
Additionally, the reform of 1994 reduced the ministers' terms of office from
lifetime appointments to a fifteen year term, without the possibility of renewal.67
The ministerial selection process was modified to require the President to submit
to the Senate a list of three candidates for each ministerial position from which
the Senate had to choose. 68 The reforms raised the vote required in the Senate
for approving ministerial appointments from a simple (greater than one-half)
majority to a super (two-thirds) majority.' If the Senate rejects all three
candidates, the President must present a list of three new candidates. 7' If the
Senate again rejects the list of new candidates, the President then has the power
to select which candidate would fill each open ministerial position.7'
61. See Interview with Elisur Arteaga Nava, legal scholar, in Mexico City, Mex. (Nov. 15, 1995).
62. See Mario Melgar Adalid, La reformia judicial mexicana, notas sobre el Consejo de lajudicaturafederal
[The Mexican Judicial Reform, Notes about the Federal Judicial Council], 30 ALEGATOS 160 (1995).
63. See id El Diario Oficial de la Federacidn de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos is an official government
publication, similar to the United States Federal Register.
64. See Vargas, supra note 9, at 297; see also supra note 31.
65. See Vargas, supra note 9, at 296; CONSTrrUCI6N POLIICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS art
94 (modified 12/31/94).
66. See Ignacio Burgoa Orihuela, Evaluacidn crftica de la Reforma Judicial Federal zedillista [Critical
Evaluation of Zedillo's Federal Judicial Reforms], 13 ARs Iumjs 43, 43-44 (1995).
67. See CONSTITUCi6N POLITCA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS art. 94 (modified 12/31/94).
68. See id art. 96 (modified 12/31/94).
69. See id Although the PRI still dominates the Senate by a three-quarters majority of the seats, the day
may come when the Senate is a more pluralistic chamber. See Stephen Fidier, More Time and Money Needed,
FINANciAL TmES, Oct. 28, 1996, at Survey 3.
70. See CoNsTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS art. 96.
71. See id.
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a. Creation of the Consejo de la Judicatura Federal
(Council of the Federal Judiciary)
The most original reform of 1994 was the creation of an administrative body
within the judicial branch to oversee administrative decisions, appointments, and
disciplinary action, as well as other policy questions.72 The inspiration for the
Consejo de la Judicatura Federal came from Spain and Italy which had similar
administrative bodies in their judicial branches.73 The stated purpose of the
Consejo de la Judicatura Federal is to increase the administrative autonomy of
the judicial branch, and to free the Supreme Court from some of its administrative
duties.74 The Consejo de la Judicatura Federal is comprised of seven members:
the President of the Supreme Court, three magistrates or judges" (chosen by
lottery from each of the three lower courts-the Collegiate Circuit Courts, the
Unitary Circuit Courts, and the District Courts), and three appointees (one
selected by the executive branch, and two selected by the Senate.) 6
b. Creation of the Acciones de Inconstitucionalidad
(Unconstitutional Action) Procedure
The acciones de inconstitucionalidad procedure, also introduced in the reform
of 1994, empowers the Supreme Court to strike down unconstitutional
legislation.77 This procedure allows the Supreme Court to make a decision
affecting legislation by declaring it invalid.78 It represents an unprecedented step
forward in Mexican jurisprudence because the Supreme Court never before had
been given the power to strike down legislation.79 Previously, because of the
fear of judge-made law,80 the judicial branch had been limited to ruling on cases
without "general effects."8'
72. See CONSTITUCIN POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDos MEXIcANos art. 100 (modified 12/31/94); see
also Melgar Adalid, supra note 38, at 185.
73. See Melgar Adalid, supra note 38, at 208-21. Constitutional scholar H6ctor Fix-Zamudio is credited with
bringing forward the idea of the Consejo de la Judicatura Federal. See Melgar Adalid, supra note 62, at 167 n.18.
74. See Melgar Adalid, supra note 62, at 165. For a critical look at the actual autonomy of the Consejo de
la Judicatura Federal, see infra Part II.C.2.
75. For an explanation of Mexican courts and judicial titles, see supra note 10.
76. See Melgar Adalid, supra note 62, at 163-64; CONsTrrUCION POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS
MEXICANOS art. 100 (modified 12/31/94).
77. See CONSTrUci6N POLtITCA DE Los ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOs art. 105, frac. H (modified
12/31/94).
78. See RABASA & CABALLERO, supra note 53, at 281.
79. See id; see also Jos6 Ram6n Cossfo D., Comentario Ardculo 105, in CoNsTrrUcION POLTICA DE Los
ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS COMENTADA [The Political Constitution of the Mexican United States
Commentated] 1033, 1051 (1995).
80. See supra Part II.A.
81. "General effects" is known in Mexico as erga omnes. The phrase is commonly used to mean that
similar cases will be decided similarly. Courts in the United States influence legislation with general effects
through the principle of stare decisis, which is somewhat comparable to erga omnes.
Despite a traditional reluctance to give the Supreme Court the power to effectively strike down or interpret
legislation with general effects, some scholars have recently proposed giving the judiciary this power. See, e.g.,
JAIE F. CARDENAs GRACIA, TRANSICI6N POLITICA Y REFORMA CONSTITUCIONAL EN M.xico 167-68 (1994);
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While the adoption of acciones de inconstitucionalidad was ground breaking,
the requirements for its use make it impractical.82 First, in order to use this
procedure, a constitutional challenge must be raised within thirty days of the law's
publication.83 Second, the challenge must be raised by either the Attorney Gen-
eral or by 33% of either house of Congress or by 33% of a state legislature.84
Although the constitutional reforms since 1917 show executive attempts to
undercut judicial prestige and autonomy and a mistrust of judicial power, changes
in the Supreme Court's composition and organizational structure explain only part
of the reason why Mexico suffers without the rule of law. A more important
limitation on the judiciary is a limitation on the power of judicial review, as
illustrated by the amparo suit.
C. Judicial Review in Mexico
The amparo85 suit serves both as a method of judicial review and as a means
of challenging the Constitution. With an amparo suit an aggrieved party initiates
legal proceedings claiming a violation of a constitutionally protected right." The
plaintiff challenges the acts of a government authority or an unfair law within the
context of a concrete case.87 A judgment resolves only the plaintiff's particular
case, without setting future precedent or affecting other potential parties.88
The main features of an amparo suit are as follows: (1) all constitutional
arguments within the Mexican judicial system must become amparo suits,
following special amparo procedures; (2) amparo suits may be heard only by
centralized courts; 9 (3) amparo suits may be filed only against government
authorities; and (4) all amparo suits must be filed by individual citizens with
rights claims.'"
An amparo suit can be characterized as one of four different types.9 The first
type of amparo suit is a specific complaint about an injustice done by a
government body.92 Examples of this type are claims of police mistreatment or
REFORMA DEL SISTEMA, supra note 10, at 165, 174-77; HCrOR FIX-ZAMUDIO. INTRODUCcI6N AL ESTUDIO DE
LA DEFENSA DE LA CONSTmCIN EN EL ORDENAMIENTO MEXICANO [An Introduction to the Study of
Constitutional Challenges in the Mexican System] 65-66 (1994).
82. For a discussion of the impracticality of the requirements, see infra Part MI.C.3.
83. See CONSTrrucI6N PoLtIcA DE LOS ESTADOS UNmOS MEXICANOS art. 105, frac. I.
84. See i
85. The literal translation of amparo is protection. See DICCIONARIO DE TRMINOS LEGALES 11 (Louis A.
Robb ed., 1992). An amparo suit is defined as a "constitutional guarantee for protection of civil rights." See id
86. See Cabrera & Headrick, supra note 9, at 253, 274-75.
87. See id at 274-75.
88. See ig at 264.
89. In 1917 only the Supreme Court was empowered to hear amparo suits. See Fix-Zamudio, supra note
10, at 163-64. Since 1951 the jurisdiction to hear amparo suits has been expanded to include the tribunales
colegiados de circuito (collegial circuit courts) created specifically for this purpose. See id
90. All four characteristics are standard features used to describe the amparo suit. See, e.g., del Rio
Rodrfguez, supra note 9, at 14-15. See generally Cabrera & Headrick. supra note 9.
91. See FIX-ZAMUDI, supra note 81, at 61-62. Fix-Zamudio describes a fifth type of amparo suit, known as
an amparo social agrario (agrarian society), a special procedure for farmers. See id at 61-62. This type of suit has
become less important since the creation of tribunalesfederales agrarios (federal agrarian courts). See id
92. See id at 61.
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illegal property seizure.Y The constitutional appeal is made with reference to the
first twenty-nine articles of the Constitution of 1917, known as the garantfas
individuales (list of human rights)."
The second kind of amparo suit is an amparo contra leyes (against laws) in
which the plaintiff argues that a written law violates constitutional principles.95
The individual challenges a law, not to have it struck from the books, but rather
to gain a personal exception from it for particular reasons to be presented.' In
the case of a favorable decision for the plaintiff, the individual personally gains
exemption, but the law stands.'
The third kind of amparo suit is an amparo casacidn (appeal) which is
essentially an appeal of a lower court judge's decision, on the grounds that the
decision violated a constitutional provision due to an "inexact" application of the
law by the lower court judge.98 The fourth kind of amparo suit challenges the
decision or act of a government body when recourse to a special administrative
court is unavailable. 9
The four kinds of amparo suits taken together form the vast majority of
constitutional challenges in Mexico."° The first two types of amparo suits will
be described in more detail below because they are essential to understanding the
institutional roots of weakness in the Mexican judicial branch.
1. Amparo Suit Against Government Abuse
The amparo suit against governmental abuse is perhaps the "classic" amparo
suit, revealing much about the evolution of both judicial review and the judicial
branch in Mexico. The amparo suit was first recognized in the Constitution of
1857, a forward-looking liberal text which armed the courts with a constitutional
reference for defending the rights of the wronged through an extensive list of
garant(as individuales.10' 'The federal judiciary developed historically with the
main purpose of bringing justice to the people and protecting human rights before
that of interpreting the laws or maintaining particular principles of legal
techniques."'1  Having developed concurrently with the institution of the
amparo suit, the Mexican judicial system has reflected the primary goal of the
amparo suit-the defense of human rights."°
93. See id
94. See CONSTITUCItN POLtrICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS art. 1-29.
95. See FIx-ZAMumlO, supra note 81, at 61.
96. See Cabrera & Headrick, supra note 9, at 264.
97. See id
98. See FIX-ZAMuDIO, supra note 81, at 61. This is based upon Roman law. See supra Part II.A.
99. See FIx-ZAMuDIO, supra note 81, at 61.
100. There are other methods of constitutional challenges, but the amparo suit is the most significant and
the other methods are rarely used. See id. at 48-49, 54, 56, 58.
101. See generally Fix-Zamudio, supra note 10, at 124-33.
102. Id at 16.
103. See del Rio Rodrfguez, supra note 9, at 15-16.
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Judicial review as a method for defending human rights is a very different task
from interpreting and shaping the meaning of a constitutional text. In a case
alleging a government violation of a citizen's rights, the Supreme Court (or the
Collegial Circuit Courts, which also are empowered to hear amparo suits) is
rarely asked to make a judgment about whether or not the "right" in question is
constitutionally protected."° Usually, the constitutional right is clear and agreed
upon as protected under the first twenty-nine articles of the Constitution. 05
Rather it is whether the right was violated that is at issue. The central questions
faced by the Supreme Court relate to establishing the facts of the case, not to the
meaning of the constitutional text. Furthermore, the function of a minister or
magistrate presiding over an amparo suit against government abuse is to apply the
law, interpreting the law as strictly as possible. 10 Judicial review of
constitutional issues in Mexico since the last century, continuing to this day,
refers merely to a special procedure for challenging government acts in the name
of human rights.1°7 Straightjacketed by the emphasis on facts over interpretation,
the amparo suit against government abuse is consequently a weak tool for
defending human rights.
2. Amparo Contra Leyes
The amparo contra leyes suit is used to challenge a law as unconstitutional and
to allow the plaintiff to receive an exemption from the law. However, even if the
plaintiff is victorious, the law in question remains in effect until legislatively
overturned." The minister or magistrate cannot invalidate the law through
judicial decision because that would constitute "judge-made law" and, therefore,
would be a violation of the Roman law principle of "separation of powers."' "9
I. WEAKNESSES IN THE MEXICAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM
This section summarizes the main problems of the amparo suit, critiques the
1994 constitutional reforms, and outlines other institutional sources of a weak
104. See Cabrera & Headrick, supra note 9. at 261.
105. The title of the section of the Mexican Constitution comprised of Articles 1-29 is called "De los
Garantfas Individuales." CoNsTrrucI6N POLtrCA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIoS M EXICANOs art 1.
The legality amparo, which protects the constitutional right of legality, has no counterpart in
the American system in any sort of proceeding. By means of this right, all violations and
mistaken interpretations of federal or state laws are transformed into violations of the
Constitution. The person who has suffered an improper application of the law by any
government authority can allege that he has been deprived of a constitutional right, and hence
bring an amparo [suit].
Cabrera & Headrick, sipra note 9, at 259. The logical implication is that most amparo suits will not involve
determining whether a "right" is violated, because illegality is itself a violation of a "right," but will involve
instead the issue of whether or not the event in question occurred.
106. See id at 263.
107. See Cabrera & Headrick, supra note 9, at 260.
108. See id at 264; see also RERRMA DEL StSrEMA, supra note 10, at 174-77.
109. See MERRYMAN, supra note 15, at 59-71.
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judiciary, including jurisprudence, specialty courts, lack of enforcement powers,
and low prestige.
A. The Limitations on the Use of an Amparo Suit
The requirements for an amparo suit create legal limitations on the
effectiveness of the suit for a variety of reasons. First, the segregation of all
constitutional issues into amparo suits lowers the "constitutional
consciousness"'1 ° of a significant part of the judiciary."' A judge who has
never been asked to rule on a constitutional issue is less likely to be able to
defend constitutional principles. If a plaintiff wishes to make a constitutional
claim, he must file a separate amparo suit distinct from his original claim.1 2
Because constitutional arguments may not be raised in "non-amparo" courts,
13
most magistrates and judges remain excluded from hearing and ruling upon
constitutional issues.' Therefore, it seems logical that a majority of the
judiciary views constitutional defenses as the task of the Supreme Court and the
Collegial Circuit Courts. The judicial segregation of the amparo suit has
unfortunate effects on the constitutional awareness of vast portions of the
judiciary. The majority of magistrates and judges are never given the opportunity
to develop a facility for defending, defining, and interpreting constitutional
principles.
Second, the segregation of the amparo suit to specific courts historically has
caused an overwhelming number of cases to come before Mexico's highest
court.1 5 Because the Supreme Court had exclusive jurisdiction of the amparo
suit before 1951, its docket was consumed with such suits." 6 Even after 1951,
and as recently as 1987, the Supreme Court continually struggled to keep up with
110. See MAURO CAPPELLETn, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 79 (1971).
111. Only the Supreme Court and Collegial Circuit Courts may hear amparo cases. See supra notes 10 and
89 and accompanying text. All other courts are precluded from hearing amparo cases and hence constitutional
arguments. I refer to these other courts as "non-amparo" courts to distinguish them from the Supreme Court
and the Collegial Circuit Courts.
112. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
114. Non-amparo magistrates and judges handle over 90% of all court cases. See A LA PUERTA DE LA LEY:
EL ESTADO DE DERECHO EN MPiICO [At the Law's Door: The State of Mexican Law] 61 (H&tor Fix Fierro
ed., 1994) [hereinafter A LA PUERTA DE LA LEY].
115. See Cabrera & Headrick, supra note 9, at 265. Despite the fact that the Supreme Court is rarely
criticized by legal scholars, the huge backlog of cases which has hampered the Supreme Court since the
nineteenth century is widely-acknowledged--even by the judicial branch's biggest defenders. See, e.g., Fix-
Zamudio, supra note 10, at 150, 164-68.
116. See Fix-Zamudo, supra note 10, at 160-61. The Supreme Court also has jurisdiction over inter- and
intra-governmental conflicts as specified in the Constitution. See CONSTITUCI6N POLTICA DE LOS ESTADOS
UNIDOS MEXICANOS art. 105.
In 1917, the Supreme Court had exclusive jurisdiction over conflicts between states, conflicts between
branches of a state government, and conflicts between state(s) and the federal governmenL See id
In 1994, the Supreme Court's jurisdiction was expanded to include also conflicts between the federal
government and a municipality, conflicts between the executive and the legislative branches, conflicts between
the federal district and states or municipalities, and conflicts between municipalities and states. See id (modified
12/31/94).
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the thousands of cases to which it had exclusive jurisdiction." 7 The newer
Collegial Circuit Courts, empowered to receive amparo suits after 195 1, also find
themselves swamped with amparo cases.
s
Third, the Supreme Court historically has lacked control over its workload.
Throughout the nineteenth century and half of the twentieth century, the Supreme
Court had served as the first stop for all amparo suits. Giving the Supreme Court
exclusive control over all amparo suits, and hence all constitutional cases,
demonstrated a lack of confidence in entrusting non-amparo courts with important
issues. An extensive lower and district court network existed in 1917, but
remained excluded from the amparo suit, not for convenience, but for reasons of
mistrust." 9
Additionally, by recreating the conditions for an overburdened Supreme Court
in 1917, the constitutionalists showed a lack of regard for the power of the
highest court. The problem of too many cases existed as far back as the year
1880, when the Supreme Court decided 2,108 cases."n  Certainly the
constitutionalists must have understood that centralizing the jurisdiction over
constitutional challenges would result in too heavy a judicial caseload. By
denying the Supreme Court the ability to control its workload, the constitutional
designers demonstrated that they considered an overburdened court unfortunate,
but necessary.
Fourth, although the Supreme Court is no longer buried in cases, a great
majority of amparo suits are thrown out of the federal courts, probably due to the
courts' heavy workload. The Centro de Investigaci6n para el Desarrollo 
2
'
(Center of Investigation for Development) (CIDAC) reports that while 11% of
plaintiffs were successful in their amparo suit in 1992, and 12% were
unsuccessful, a full 77% of all amparo suits filed resulted in a denial of
proceedings."
Improper procedure is the most common reason given by the Supreme Court
for a denial.123  While CIDAC considered the possibility that the courts are
weeding out meritorious cases from nonmeritorious ones, it found instead that the
Supreme Court and Collegial Circuit Courts have enacted excessively rigid
117. See generally FIX-ZAMUIO, supra note 81, at 62-63.
118. See A LA PUERTA DE LA LEY, supra note 114, at 79.
119. See Fix-Zamudio, supra note 10, at 153 (commenting that the authors of the 1917 Constitution decided
that between the possibility of corrupt local judges and the danger of centralization, the latter was the lesser of
two evils); see also id for a discussion on the mistrust of local judges. Mistrust of local judges may be just as
strong today. See, e.g., ARTEAGA NAVA, supra note 10, at 492. "Only those who do not know how [the district
courts] operate would defend their existence." Id (translation by Michael C. Taylor).
120. See Fix-Zamudio, supra note 10, at 150.
121. Centro de Jnvestigacidn de Desarrollo (CIDAC) is a non-profit, independent institution dedicated to
investigating the economic, social, and political development of Mexico, as well as to strengthening the economy
through contributing information in the form of studies, investigations, and development recommendations. See
A LA PUERTA DE LA LEY, supra note 114, at book cover (translation by Michael C. Taylor).
122. See id at 65.
123. See id at 66-67. Improper procedure also appears to be an excuse used by the courts not to proceed
with a case. See id
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procedural rules in order to reduce their caseload." CIDAC argues that the
explanation for the incredible number of denials has more to do with institutional
inabiity to handle the quantity of cases than for any other legal or practical
reason.
25
Fifth, a law declared unconstitutional does not set legal precedent. A
successful challenge brought under an amiparo contra leyes suit, resulting in a
ruling that a law is unconstitutional, serves to help solely the individual who
brought the suit. For example, a plaintiff may bring an amparo contra leyes suit
against an over-burdensome tax law as a violation of the constitutional right not
to be deprived of a living."n A favorable ruling exempts the plaintiff from the
tax, which has been, in effect, declared unconstitutional.'2 Nevertheless, all
other citizens are subject to the same unconstitutional tax law, unless they too file
an amparo contra leyes suit (or the legislature decides to change the law).' s
The consequences of these limitations on the strength of the judicial system are
several. First, the political system allows an unconstitutional law to be validly
applied to all other citizens. Second, only those citizens attuned to the minutiae
of the legal system and who have the economic resources to hire counsel will be
able to file an amparo contra leyes suit seeking exemption. The rules of the
amparo contra leyes suit in effect encourage an unfair distribution of justice. 9
A third consequence has been that the Supreme Court and the Collegial Circuit
Courts are burdened by requests to exempt different individuals from the same
unconstitutional law, preventing the courts from deciding other important
issues.' 3 Furthermore, because only one affected individual at a time may file
an amparo suit, an amparo suit can not be used for a class-action suit, excluding
a useful mechanism for addressing a whole range of emerging issues, such as
environmental and consumer rights.' 3'
Many civil law countries allow something similar to a United States class-
action suit, 32 in which a citizens' coalition can represent a group of people and
bring a suit, strengthening their case and saving their resources. It is easy to
conceptualize a comparable situation in Mexico in which peasants' rights have
been violated by a government action. Although the peasants have neither the
resources nor the knowledge to file individual amparo suits, only he or she has
the right to do so.
124. See id at 68-80.
125. See id at 79.
126. See REFORMA DEL SISTEMA, supra note 10, at 175.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See ARTEAGA NAVA, supra note 10, at 498. "The amparo suit has become a true article of luxury that
only the highest and most powerful classes can use." Id. (translation by Michael C. Taylor).
130. See Cabrera & Headrick, supra note 9, at 265.
131. See MIGUEL ACOSTA ROMERO & GENARO DAVID G6NGORA PlAENTEL, CONSTITUCION POITICA DE
LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS: LEGISLACI6N, JURISPRUDENCIA, Docr.INA [The Political Constitution of
the Mexican United States: Legislation, Jurisprudence, Doctrine] 6-8 (3d ed. 1987) (citing the ideas of Lucio
Cabrera Acevedo). See generally Lucio Cabrera Acevedo, ElAmparo Colectivo (Jan. 6, 1996) (unpublished essay
presented to the Mexican Lawyer's Bar) (on file with author).
132. See Cabrera Acevedo, supra note 131. at 17-19. See generally FIX-ZAMUDIO, supra note 81, at 65-66.
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Finally, the Supreme Court has ruled that actos consumados de un modo
irreparable (government acts which have already taken place and cannot be
undone) may not be challenged through the use of an amparo suit.133  The
justification is essentially "what is done is done," with the belief that a
constitutional court case will not right the wrong.1 3' Lost in this line of
thinking is the idea that punishment after the fact may prevent future government
transgressions.133
While the above discussion assumes that the amparo suit is responsible for
Mexico's weak judicial branch, the opposite may also be true. Reversing the
direction of causality, we may see that the amparo suit is not so much the cause
of judicial weakness as it is a symptom---albeit a symptom which in turn
discourages seeking a cure. In an environment hostile to judicial power, the
amparo suit has lasted so long only because it has done so little.'3 Other
scholars echo this analysis, arguing that the amparo suit developed as a product
of the fear that the judicial branch would effectively subject the other powers of
government to the law. 3 The amparo suit's ineffectiveness has served as an
acceptable compromise for constitutional framers hostile to judicial power.
Weak courts and the amparo suit have interacted historically to form a vicious
cycle of powerlessness. The amparo suit, however, is not a unique institution in
this regard. Jurisprudence, specialty courts, rules of enforcement, and the lack of
prestige associated with judgeships are all symptoms, as well as causes of
injustice in Mexico.
B. Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court creates precedent, or stare decisis, when it consecutively
decides five similar cases in the same way, voting with a super-majority (eight of
the eleven) of the ministers.131 In developing these rules of jurisprudence,
nineteenth-century Mexican legislators attempted to emulate the United States
system of judicial interpretation, as described by Alexis de Tocqueville. 139 The
original creators of the amparo suit in Mexico made explicit reference in 1841 to
de Tocqueville's description as a justification for the amparo suit." A few
years later, the framers of Mexico's Constitution of 1857 expressly intended to
adopt the United States system of judicial review as described by de Tocque-
ville.141 When Mexico's constitutional designers attempted to rigidly follow de
133. See A LA PUERTA DE LA LEY, supra note 114, at 69.
134. See id
135. See id
136. See BAKER, supra note 9, at 26.
137. See, e.g., REFoRMA DEL SISTEMA, supra note 10, at 170.
138. See CONSTITUCION POLtnCA DE LOS ESTADOS UN1DOS MEICANOS arL 94; Htctor Fix-Zamudio &
H6ctor Fix Fierro, Comentario Aritculo 94, in CONsTITucION POLfTICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS
COMENTADA 935, 939-40 (1995).
139. See Fix-Zamudio, supra note 10, at 124-26.
140. See idt at 126.
141. See id at 131.
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Tocqueville's description, however, they created a weak institution of
jurisprudence which bears little resemblance to the United States model.
Describing United States jurisprudence, de Tocqueville wrote that "when a
judge attacks a law in the course of an obscure argument in a particular case
... the law thus censured is not abolished; its moral force is diminished, but its
physical effect is not suspended. It is only gradually, under repeated judicial
blows, that it finally succumbs."14 2 It is easy to see that the attempt to emulate
the United States system of "hidden" jurisprudence, to undermine legislation only
gradually "under repeated judicial blows" led to what has been termed the "regla
de cinco" ("rule of five"). 43 Mexican legislators and constitutionalists decided
that five consecutive decisions constituted "repeated judicial blows,"1 although
no scholar in Mexico has explained why five consecutive decisions is required to
emulate de Tocqueville's formula.
C. Inherent Weaknesses in the Reform of 1994
The judicial reform of 1994 was intended to include the most important
changes to the courts since the original Constitutional Congress of 1917. Certainly
in terms of the great number of constitutional articles reformed at one
time--twenty-seven-the reform was unusual.4 5 In the creation of new
institutions and the modification of old ones, the 1994 reform represents a
milestone. President Zedillo's reforms of the Supreme Court, however, returned
to the ideals of the 1917 reform-the last time a significant effort was made to
guarantee an independent and effective judiciary. In that sense the 1994 reform
is a good, though belated, return to the past. In terms of breaking new ground,
however, President Zedillo's reform fell short. Analysis reveals the same
historical patterns of mistrust and undercutting of judicial power which have
characterized reforms throughout the twentieth century.
1. Replacement of the Supreme Court Ministers
When President Zedillo fired the sitting members of the Supreme Court and
replaced them with new ministers, he harkened back to previous times."
However, his executive elimination of the leaders of the judicial branch did not
pass without criticism, in contrast to previous constitutional reforms. 7
142. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 102-103 (1969). A Spanish translation of this
passage is cited by Fix-Zamudio as the inspiration for Mexican jurisprudence. See Fix-Zamudio, supra note 10.
at 125 n.25.
143. See generally Fix-Zamudio, supra note 10, at 124-26. But see Lucio Cabrera, La Jurisprudencia in
LA SUPREMA CORTE DE JusTicIA Y EL PENSAM1INTO JURIDICO 242 (Poder Judicial de la Federacidn ed., 1985)
(Mexican jurisprudence is not based upon a mistaken interpretation of de Tocqueville, but rather on a direct
understanding of the United States system.).
144. See CONSTITUCIN POLTICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOs MEXaCANOS art. 94.
145. Past judicial reforms typically affected fewer articles: 1926 (1 article); 1928 (6 articles); 1934 (2
articles); 1937 (2 articles); 1940 (1 article); 1943 (1 article); 1949 (4 articles); 1958 (1 article); 1967 (7 articles);
1979 (1 article); 1982 (1 article); 1988 (5 articles). See GUTrIRm & RIVES, supra note 21, at 152-54.
146. See supra Part II.B.
147. See Interview with Juan de Dios Castro Lozano, PartidoAcci6n Nacional (National Action Party) (PAN)
Senator, in Mexico City, Mex. (Mar. 28, 1996).
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President Zedillo was not deterred by the criticism because an opposition
party-the right-of-center Partido Accidn Nacional (National Action Party)
(PAN)-supported the change.'" Political methods previously considered
undemocratic suddenly became legitimate because the PAN supported them. A
PAN senator explained, for example, that eliminating the entire Supreme Court
by presidential decree was legitimate because it was approved by a two-thirds
constitutional majority of the Congress.1 49
In the replacement of the twenty-six existing ministers with eleven fresh faces,
differences of opinion arose about the legitimacy of the process. By the strict
letter of the Constitution, the President should have submitted thirty-three
names-three candidates for each of eleven available positions.1" Most
observers agree that the executive submitted a list of eighteen proposed names to
the Senate,"' from which the Senate was to select eleven choices. Names in
addition to the original eighteen also may have been mentioned unofficially
during the nomination process, but it appears that these nomination additions may
have been part of a late attempt to satisfy the constitutional requirement of thirty-
three nominations.
5 2
Despite the appearance of starting over with a clean slate, the new Supreme
Court was born of politics as usual in Mexico. PAN Senator Castro Lozano
argues that the process of selection was reasonably legitimate, given that his party
agreed with at least eight of the eleven ministers eventually chosen by the rulin
Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party) (PRI). ' f
Other scholars claim that the nomination process was fixed by the executive
branch." A second nomination list, consisting of the eleven "chosen" ministers,
was supposedly sent from the President to the members of his party who control
three-quarters of the senatorial seats. 15 5  Furthermore, the "confirmation
148. See id
Since 1988, the PRI has lacked the constitutionally-required two-thirds majority in the Chamber of Deputies
necessary to reform the Constitution. See CONSTrITUCIN POLtICA DE LOS EsTADOS MExICANoS art. 135;
ALONSO LUJAMBIO, FEDERALiSMO Y CONoRESO EN EL CAMBIo POLITICO DE Mbxco 172 (1995) (The PRI had
a 52%, 64%, and 60% majority of the Chamber of Deputies in 1988, 1991, and 1994, respectively). See supra
note 48 for a description of the PRI.
Without the necessary two-thirds majority, the PRI has been negotiating constitutional reforms mostly with
the PAN, with which it found ideological agreement in favor of issues such as economic liberalization. See
LUJA MBIO, supra, at 171. The PAN supported the 1994 reforms to the judiciary. See Interview with Juan de
Dios Castro Lozano, supra note 147.
149. See Interview with Juan de Dios Castro Lozano. supra note 147. It is doubtful, however, whether
Senator Castro Lozano would have approved removing the President or members of Congress before their terms
expired or of replacing them with other politicians, even if this act of removal could be approved by a
constitutional congressional majority.
150. See CoNslTruc6N POLhilCA DE LOS EsTADos UNIDOS MEXICANOS art 96 (modified 12/31/94).
151. See Interview with Juan de Dios Castro Lozano, supra note 147; Interview with Elisor Arteaga Nava,
supra note 61.
152. See Interview with Lucio Cabrera, legal scholar, in Mexico City, Mex. (June 3, 1996).
153. See Interview with Juan de Dios Castro Lozano. supra note 147. See supra note 48 for a description
of the PRI.
154. See Interview with Elisur Arteaga Nava. supra note 61.
155. See id
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hearings" conducted by the Senate left much to be desired." s The Senate's
questioning of candidates most likely had no effect on the eventual selection of
ministers because the Senate panel reportedly asked only one question of each
candidate.
157
Despite objections to the process of selection, it should be acknowledged that
the 1994 reform produced a Supreme Court whose size is more manageable. The
reduction in the number of members of the Supreme Court, although
accomplished by abolishing the existing court, represents a positive, practical step
forward given that twenty-one, and, at times, twenty-six, ministers could not have
been conducive to decision-making.
The reform eliminating lifetime appointments and limiting Supreme Court
ministers to terms of fifteen years.58 does not obviously improve the functioning
of the entire body; if anything, it reduces the number of years an experienced
jurist could serve on the Supreme Court. But, the fifteen-year term does not
necessarily restrict a minister's effectiveness. Fifteen years represents a reasonable
amount of time for a minister to both feel secure in his or her position and gather
enough experience to positively affect the Supreme Court. Most importantly,
fifteen years is enough time for ministers to outlast two presidential terms, greatly
increasing the likelihood of judicial independence from the executive branch.
Additionally, the two-thirds majority requirement for Senate approval of the
appointment of a minister is a small, but positive, step towards guaranteeing that
ministerial appointments satisfy more than one party.
2. The Attempt at Autonomy by Creation of the Consejo de La Judicatura
Federal (Council of the Federal Judiciary): One Step Forward, Two
Steps Back
The creation of the Consejo de La Judicatura Federal (Consejo) 5 9 is
another positive step towards increasing the autonomy of the judiciary. The
Consejo has the potential to improve the functioning of the entire judicial branch.
It should relieve the Supreme Court of administrative duties, such as appointing
and disciplining magistrates and judges, allowing the Supreme Court to
concentrate on its central and recently refined task of defending the Constitution.
But, the membership of the Consejo raises old questions of mistrust and lack
of respect for the judiciary. Having three justices selected from the lower courts
(one from each of the three lower courts), for example, is an admirable idea
which allows input into judicial administration from all levels. The selection is
made by lottery, however, which shows a lack of confidence that the judiciary
will select competent members over political allies.
The most useful way of picking lower court judges would be through a merit
system which would ensure that only interested and able members constitute the
156. See id.
157. See id Constitutional scholar Elisur Arteaga Nava was present at the confirmation hearings and appears
to have submitted most of the questions.
158. See supra Part ll.B.4.a.
159. See supra Part U.B.4.a.
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Consejo. Under the current system, a lottery randomly selects members, of
varying ability and interest, for an administrative body with great potential power
over the federal judicial system. The Consejo runs a great risk of selecting
mediocre candidates from the judicial branch while simultaneously eliminating the
opportunity to select the best. In the interest of making the judicial choices
"apolitical," the reforms have hamstrung the Consejo. PAN leaders, who
approved the reforms of 1994, are currently examining ways to change the lottery
method of selecting lower justices for the Consejo, but they continue to worry
about preventing executive branch attempts to "stack" the Consejo with political
allies. P6
The three appointees from the legislative and executive branches provide
further evidence that the judicial branch is the weakest of the three governmental
powers. Apologists for intervention by the legislature and the executive point to
European models which feature appointees or members of other branches.
161
They also cite "checks and balances" and "separation of powers" theories as
justifications for the participation of the executive and legislature. 62
Foreign models, however, are not always applicable to Mexico. The history
of executive dominance over both the judiciary and the legislature in Mexico
should be sufficient argument against creating more avenues for presidential
intervention. Given that the Consejo affects only policy within the judicial branch,
the "checks and balances" provided by the Senate and the President within the
Consejo create additional undue interference by the other two branches of
government. Further, given the present reality of the Senate majority's
obsequiousness to the President,163 the President has three "sure votes" on the
Consejo.
The only apparent saving grace of the Consejo is that the members of the
judicial branch outnumber the other two branches' representatives by four to three.
However, even this is not an effective majority. A justifying argument for the
three representatives of the Senate and the President has been that once the
representatives become members of the Consejo, they work for the judicial
branch.' Scholar Mario Melgar Adalid argues that "breaking the juridical link"
between the Senate representatives and the Senate, and between the presidential
representative and the President, is sufficient for independence."
Melgar Adalid's argument fails to be convincing for two reasons. First, the
origin of any political position determines in great measure the policies and
loyalties of the position's holder, notwithstanding attractive phrases such as
"breaking the juridical link."' Second, the legislation's fine print demonstrates
the relevance of the origin of the Consejo members. The regulatory legislation
160. See Interview with Juan de Dios Castro Lozano, supra note 147.
161. See Melgar Adalid, supra note 38, at 162.
162. See, e.g., Mario Melgar Adalid, ComentarioArtculo 100, in CONSTrrucI6N POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS
UNImoS MExicANos COMENTADA 981, 986 (1995). Melgar Adalid is a current member of the Consejo.
163. See supra notes 48, 54, 55 and accompanying text.
164. See Melgar Adalid, supra note 62, at 162-63.
165. See id at 162.
166. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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states that if the Consejo acts in a committee, then each committee is to be made
up of three members, and further that of these three, two must come from the
legislative or executive branch and one must come from the judicial branch. 67
By providing a majority of legislative or executive members on each committee,
the legislative and executive branches are guaranteed a majority vote in all work
done by the Consejo. This reform makes the discourse on "increasing the
autonomy of the judicial branch" through the Consejo ring hollow."
It should be acknowledged, however, that the Consejo may redress a failing of
the judicial branch that occurred before 1994. The Consejo is responsible for
disciplining judges who act inappropriately or who make "irresponsible"
rulings."6 To understand the importance of these changes, an explanation of the
previous system of oversight in which the entire Supreme Court theoretically
maintained discipline over all lower court judges is necessary. 70
In practice, each of the twenty-six ministers who formed part of the Supreme
Court prior to 1994 was said to have a "stable" of lower circuit court and district
court judges for whom he or she was responsible."" "Responsibility" in this
sense involved a patron-client relationship, in which the minister would do his
or her best to ensure a profitable and promising career in return for loyalty. 72
If a lower court judge failed to display sufficient loyalty, or worse, committed
either legal or political transgressions in the eyes of the minister, the judge's
career would stagnate or otherwise be jeopardized. In the pre-1994 system,
political and legal discipline was maintained through the vertical links of a
minister's "stable.' ' 7 3 With the reform of 1994, however, the Consejo's
jurisdiction over discipline suggests a more neutral, standardized procedure for
overseeing judges.
3. The Unreasonableness of the Standards Imposed in the Newly-Created
Acciones de Inconstitucionalidad (Unconstitutional Actions) Procedure
The requirements placed upon acciones de inconstitucionalidad74 make a
challenge under this new procedure nearly impossible to raise. The flaws in these
requirements are obvious. To begin with, raising a challenge to a statute within
thirty days is illogical. Either a statute should be struck down for
unconstitutionality or it should not, regardless of time. Surviving thirty days
167. See Melgar Adalid, supra note 62, at 163.
168. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
169. See CONSTITUCI6N PoLfTrCA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDos MExIcANos art. 100 (modified 12/31/94); see
also Melgar Adalid, supra note 38, at 200.
170. See Interview with Juan de Dios Castro Lozano, supra note 147.
171. See id
172. See id
173. See id Understanding the "stable" system also sheds light on why the PAN was eager to join President
Zedillo in eliminating the twenty-six sitting ministers. The herculean task of "cleaning the stables" must have
seemed impossible to the PAN without firing every minister. The eleven new ministers presumably do not have
such well-developed patronage relationships with the lower justices as did their predecessors. For a discussion
of patronage and "patron-client" relationships, see BARRY, supra note 10, at 21.
174. See supra Part H.B.4.b.
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unchallenged should not make a law constitutional. 1" Practically speaking, it
may take years or decades before a statute's constitutional flaws become clear.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court is unlikely to gather evidence within thirty days
on the practical ramifications of the challenged legislation, possibly resulting in
a decision based upon short-term political calculations. The thirty-day statute of
limitations demonstrates the lack of trust and rigidity of thought which has
characterized previous judicial reforms.
Additionally, requiring the Attorney General or 33% of a legislative chamber
to raise a challenge under acciones de inconstitucionalidad'76 makes little
practical sense. The Attorney General, a presidential appointee who can be
removed by the President at will,1" is unlikely to raise a constitutional
challenge to legislation, because legislation is simply not approved without
presidential support."17 Congress is more likely to raise a constitutional
challenge. Again, however, the limitation lacks constitutional sense. Either a
legislative act is constitutional or it is not. Raising the issue of constitutionality
should not depend upon the legislative support a challenge generates. 79 Was the
law in question not the error of the Congress or the state legislature in the first
place? Furthermore, given the paucity of federal legislators who are not in the
ruling party, obtaining a 33% vote in opposition to a majority-supported law
would be difficult.1
s°
With the current realities of Mexican politics, the restriction on who may
initiate the challenge and the thirty-day time limit virtually guarantees that the
acciones de inconstitucionalidad procedure will only be used in a political
struggle between government branches. The procedure is not likely to be used, as
was originally intended, to elicit a carefully reasoned judicial decision about the
constitutionality of a controversial statute.
In reviewing the 1994 changes in general, and the acciones de
inconstitucionalidad in particular, what is striking is not what the reforms did, but
rather what they did not do. The 1994 reform is not a great leap forward in the
organization of the Supreme Court, but rather a cautious return to an
approximation of the Supreme Court's structure in 1917. The creation of weak
new procedures, such as the acciones de inconstitucionalidad, only emphasizes
the need for more profound thinking about judicial review on the part of Mexico's
reformers.
175. See Burgoa Orihuela, supra note 66, at 51.
176. See supra Part H.B.4.b.
177. The presidential power to name the Attorney General is contained in CONSTrrUCION POLtTICA DE LOS
ESTADOS UNnDos MEICANOS art. 89, frac. IX (modified 12/31/94). See ARTEAGA NAVA, supra note 10, at 409.
178. See Burgoa Orihuela, supra note 66, at 51.
179. See id
180. See id; see also Hctor Fix-Fierro, La Reforma Judicial de 1994 y las Acciones de Inconstitucionalidad
[The 1994 Judicial Reform and Unconstitutional Actions], 13 ARs lURms 109, 118-19. For a discussion of
political parties, see supra notes 48 and 148 and accompanying text.
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D. Other Sources of Weakness
1. Specialty Courts
An additional source of weakness in the judicial branch is the tradition of
specialized courts. The executive branch has created entire court systems to deal
with specialized legal cases, such as the Tribunal Fiscal de la Federacidn
(Federal Fiscal Court), the Tribunal de lo Contencioso Administrativo del Distrito
Federal (Court of the Federal District for Administrative Conflicts) and the
Tribunal de lo Contencioso Electoral (Federal Electoral Conflicts Court)."'
Critical analysts see these specialty courts as a political and demagogic attempt
at control by the executive branch. 2 Specialty courts outside of the judicial
branch have roots going back to colonial Mexico, when nearly every profession
had its own tribunals. 183 In terms of power, the executive branch, under whom
most of the courts are administered, has benefitted from these proliferating
institutions. By creating a court system parallel to the judicial branch, the
executive may transfer legal jurisdiction to a set of judges and courts which are
primarily under the executive's control.'
2. Lack of Enforcement Powers
One result of a strict "separation of powers" doctrine is that the executive
branch is charged with enforcing all judicial decisions." All jails, all
sentencing, all policing, and all methods of enforcing justice are under the
executive branch which should in theory "execute" the wishes of the courts.'
In practice, however, many amparo suits and ordinary court resolutions go
unenforced. Is7 Not coincidentally, impunity is most evident in those cases which
inconvenience the executive branch.'8 Because most amparo suits are
challenges to government illegality, the amparo suit is rendered useless when the
executive selectively enforces decisions. The Supreme Court does not have the
power to enforce its own decisions even when it finds the government has
violated the Constitution.
3. Low Prestige of Judgeships
It should be obvious, but bears re-emphasis, that the power of a judge in
Mexico is very different from that of a judge in the United States. This is for two
181. See REFoRMA DEL SISTEMA, supra note 10, at 170.
182. See ARTEAGA NAVA, supra note 10, at 494. Specialty courts outside of the judicial branch are common
throughout Latin America to this day, and seem to diminish the power of the judiciary in most every country
where they appear. See Rosenn, supra note 12, at 24-27.
183. See ARTEAGA NAVA, supra note 10, at 493-94.
184. See Rosenn, supra note 12, at 26.
185. See REFORMA DEL SISTEMA, supra note 10, at 179-80.
186. See id at 179.
187. See id at 180.
188. See id. at 179-80. "The executive impedes and blocks the political implication of the judicial branch
when it is convenient to do so by selectively applying penal action, making impunity the rule, not the exception,
especially in crimes with political implications." Id (translation by Michael C. Taylor).
(Vol. 27
WHY NO RULE OF LAW IN MEXICO?
reasons: the power of interpretation 89 and prestige. In terms of prestige,
judges in Mexico simply do not enjoy the same cultural respect or undergo the
same extensive professional preparation as judges do in common law countries.
In Mexico, a position as a judge may be obtained by a professional with a legal
degree shortly after completing school.' 90 Mediocre students and those from
lower classes with socioeconomic ambitions tend to fill the ranks of judges. 91
Presumably, the security of a government position offers these lawyers a baseline
of socioeconomic status below which they cannot fall.
Additionally, Supreme Court ministers are traditionally politicians who for one
reason or another must be removed from the political fray.'9 The implication
of this practice of appointment is that while many ministers of the Supreme Court
are qualified only by their obsequiousness to the President, a good number can
be downright corrupt.
IV. FINAL THOUGHTS
Despite, and because of, decades of constitutional reform, institutional
arrangements continue to prevent the Supreme Court and the judicial branch from
exercising effective power. The primary obstacle is the amparo suit, which limits
constitutional cases to a special procedure apart from ordinary legal proceedings.
Because of its special nature, its complicated procedures, and its lack of stare
decisis effect, the amparo suit is a severely limiting institution. Until the amparo
suit is truly reformed, constitutional guarantees remain threatened in Mexico.
Beyond judicial review, however, the Supreme Court must reckon with an
institutional history of co-optation and control by the executive branch. While the
reform of 1994 has given the Supreme Court some additional powers and control,
many steps are still needed before the Supreme Court gains the legitimacy which
it has never had and so desperately needs.
Mexico needs court-enforced control of the Constitution. Since the end of
World War II, and as a reaction against the experience of fascist Europe in the
1930s, a consensus has developed in comparative law that courts must be able to
effectively enforce basic constitutional principles. 93 Mexico, as a nation
aspiring to democratic governance, needs a judicial check on its other two
branches of power. Democracy, as we in the United States understand it, is
impossible in Mexico if the judiciary is too weak to enforce the rule of law."9
189. See supra Part II.A.
190. Law students with whom I spoke at the Universidad Iberoamericana, an elite, private university in
Mexico City, assured me that obtaining a judgeship shortly after leaving the University was both relatively easy
and utterly without prestige.
In Mexico, lawyers-to-be enter a five-year legal education program upon completing high school. Thus, new
judges may be as young as their early-20s and may never have practiced law.
191. See MERRYMAN, supra note 15, at 109; see also Rosenn, supra note 12, at 33.
192. See REFORMA DEL SISTEMA, supra note 10, at 173. "It has been a frequent practice that the President
gives the position of minister to the most malleable elements of the judicial branch, and especially to those
public functionaries who see in the judiciary the safe refuge of quite questionale political careers." 141
(translation by Michael C. Taylor).
193. See CAPPELLETr, supra note 110, at vii-ix.
194. See generally TRANSITION To DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY (Irwin
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To study the judiciary in Mexico, therefore, is to delve into an essential piece of
the democracy puzzle. Hopes for a democratic Mexico remain quixotic as long
as the country fails to find a method of enforcing the rule of law.
What should be done about improving Mexico's judicial branch and therefore
chances for rule of law and democratic governance? There is no quick-fix answer.
The answer is not to reform the Constitution, reword the amparo suit, and hope
for a legal transformation by fiat. The solutions will certainly be hard-won and
gradual. Far from suggesting answers, this Article is offered as a diagnosis of
institutional ills and as a first step towards necessary change.
V. CONCLUSION
Mexico suffers without the rule of law, a condition which affects every citizen
every day, from the President to the poorest peasant. While many explanations
may be offered for the national lack of rule of law, this Article has focused on the
institutional and legal causes of a weak judicial branch. A review of constitutional
reforms reveals a pattern of mistrust of the courts throughout the twentieth
century. An analysis of the amparo suit and jurisprudence shows how these
institutions have been both the cause and effect of a weak judicial branch. Finally,
specialty courts, the lack of powers of enforcement, and the low prestige of
judgeships combine to strengthen the executive branch at the expense of the
judiciary. While these institutions continue unchanged, Mexico may expect neither
rule of law nor democracy.
Stotzky ed. 1993) (a collection of essays on judicial function and independence in Latin America).
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